DISSERTATION

Essays on Economic Incentives in Real Estate Essay 1: Optimal Compensation and Value Added in Commercial Real Estate Brokerage. (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: This paper presents a model characterizing a Pareto optimal brokerage agreement between a seller of a property and a real estate broker who has private information about the market valuation of the property. Under the assumption that the broker faces increasing costs of securing higher offers for the property, the model predicts that an optimal brokerage commission should be a convex function of the size of the offer that the broker secures for the property. In addition, this paper presents a novel sample of actual contracts from a major commercial real estate broker that is largely consistent with the predictions of the model.
Essay 2: Housing Tenure and Self-Selection in the Labor Market.
Abstract: Does homeownership result in negative externalities in the labor market? This paper argues against a highly debated externality question by presenting a self-selection model that indicates homeowners as having a greater incentive than renters to select jobs with productivity that match their ability. Differential search and mobility costs inherent across housing tenure result in homeownership serving as a signal for job match quality. Additionally, through the lens of the self-selection hypothesis, this paper provides a job match quality explanation for varying unemployment and employment duration across tenure. Finally, empirical evidence provides support for the self-selection model and suggests that homeowners are indeed better matched than renters.
Essay 3: Information Content of Credit Ratings: Evidence from Institutional Mortgage-Backed Securities Holdings.
Abstract: The information content of mortgage backed securities' ratings is highly debated since the recent financial crisis. This paper tests the information content of ratings using a unique framework. The innovation is to contrast rating changes with the trades of institutional investors that have a low cost of acquiring information on the risk of the rated security. A comparison of the trading activity of low information acquisition cost investors and ratings issued by credit rating agencies thus enables an explicit test of the information content of ratings. 
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